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CASE NOTES
Taxation—Interest Deductions—Application of the "Business Purpose"
Test to Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code—Rothschild
v. United States.'—On December 6, 1955, Rothschild, a taxpayer in the
90 percent income bracket, purchased $1,500,000 of United States 2% Treas-
ury notes, due August 15, 1956. These notes were purchased at a discount,
$1,464,815, because of the fact that some of the interest coupons had been
detached. To finance the transaction the taxpayer borrowed $1,500,000 from
the Mellon National Bank and signed a full recourse promissory note for that
amount payable to the bank. The note was to come due August 15, 1956,
with interest at the rate of sg percent. Two days after the taxpayer made
arrangements to purchase the Treasury notes, the full cost was remitted to
the broker by the Mellon National Bank and the balance of the $1,500,000
loan ($35,185) was remitted to the taxpayer. The Treasury notes were then
sent to the lending bank to be held as collateral for the promissory note.
Additional security could be required by the bank at any time.
On December 8, 1955, the same day that the bank paid the broker the
$1,500,000, the taxpayer prepaid the interest on the promissory note with a
check for $60,135 payable to the lending bank. He deducted this interest from
ordinary income on his 1955 return. On August 15, 1956, at the taxpayer's
request, the lending bank redeemed the notes and applied the proceeds in
satisfaction of taxpayer's promissory note. On his 1956 income tax return,
the taxpayer reported a capital gain of $35,185. This was the first of three
substantially identical transactions, the last two involving interest deduc-
tions on the taxpayer's 1956 and 1957 returns and capital gains on his 1957
and 1958 returns.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the greater part of all
the above interest deductions. He reasoned that the transactions had been
entered into solely for the purpose of creating interest deductions for tax
reasons and, in his opinion, such deductions were not allowable under Section
163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The taxpayer paid the assessment
and filed for a refund in the United States Court of Claims. The report of
the Commissioner of the Court of Claims to that court HELD: the deduc-
tions should be allowed. The transactions had substance and the indebted-
ness was genuine. Tax avoidance motives do not control deductibility under
section 163 (a). 2
This case represents the latest in a long series of cases dealing with the
use of interest deductions to secure after-tax profits . 3 This area of the tax
law has produced substantial disagreement among the courts and among the
legal commentators who have attempted to dispel the confusion. The Roths-
1 Rothschild v. United States, 7 CCH 1968 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. it 7910 (Ct. Cl.
Comm'r's Rep. Dec. 18, 1967).
2 Id. at 72,523-24. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,,§ 163(a) provides: "There shall be allowed
as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." This
was formerly Section 23(b) of the 1939 Code.
3 See the cases cited in 2 P-H Fed. Taxes 13,006.
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child case serves as a vehicle for a re-examination of the various inconsist-
encies in this area of the law.
The basic situation generally involves a taxpayer buying interest-bearing
notes or obligations at a discount and financing the purchase with a loan
secured by the notes. The interest he owes will exceed his interest income
and his expected gain on resale of the notes. No economic profit will result
but there can be a tax profit for high-bracket taxpayers. The deduction for
interest offsets ordinary income, while the gain on the sale can be capital
gain, taxed at no more than 25 percent.
The Commissioner for the Court of Claims determined that there were
two main issues in the Rothschild case: first, whether the transactions were
economically devoid of substance, i.e., involving a lack of real indebtedness,
in which case the interest clearly would not be deductible; and second,
whether interest paid on borrowed funds invested in a transaction involving
real indebtedness, but not yielding any earnings before taxes, was deductible
from ordinary income under section 163 (a) . 4
The first issue concerns the "sham" test which revolves around the exist-
ence or nonexistence of a genuine indebtedness accruing to the taxpayer as a
result of the transaction in question. 5 The "sham" test is concerned with
whether the alleged transaction has really occurred: whether the underlying
realities contradict the appearances. If a court finds a lack of real indebted-
ness, i.e., a "hocus-pocus" paper transaction, the transaction is considered a
"sham."" It is well settled in such cases that deductions of so-called interest
payments should be denied.?
The trial commissioner in Rothschild clearly was correct in finding that
the transaction there involved could not be interpreted as a "sham" trans-
action. The bank actually loaned the money to Rothschild. He purchased the
securities and transferred them to the bank as collateral for the loan. He
tendered a full recourse promissory note which gave the bank the right to
call for more security. As the trial commissioner stated: "Once Rothschild
entered into the transactions he was required to do all that he did do, and no
step was lacking in substance or legal effect." 8 The "sham" test is simply
not applicable to such a case.
The real issue in Rothschild was whether the interest deductions should
be allowed when the only purpose of the transaction from which they de-
rived was to obtain an after-tax profit. The trial commissioner in Rothschild
4 1968 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., at 72,518.
5 See, e.g., George G. Lynch, 31 T.C. 990, affd 273 F. Supp. 613 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Eli
D. Goodstein, 30 T.C. 1178 (1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959). Lynch involved
a series of transactions over a seven-day period allegedly resulting in payment of interest
on loans to finance a purchase by the taxpayers of government bonds. The bonds were
never physically passed between the parties involved. The lender in Lynch had less than
$1400 cash on hand while it was loaning the taxpayer over $600,000. No loan was ever
actually made and no interest was ever actually paid. As the Circuit Court stated: "When
the series of transactions . . . was completed the parties were exactly where they had
been at the outset...." 273 F.2d at 872.
6 See cases cited note 5 supra.
7 Id. See also Broome v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 613 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
8 1968 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., at 72,523.
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found that a nontax purpose was not needed to secure an interest deduction
as long as the transaction involved a real indebtedness. However, whether a
transaction needs a nontax purpose, i.e., a business purpose, before interest
can be deducted is by no means clear and the courts continue to arrive at
diverse conclusions."
The "business purpose" test states that interest cannot be deducted if no
economic gain could be realized from a transaction beyond a tax deduction."
This test grew out of the landmark Supreme Court decision of Gregory v.
Havering." Gregory involved a corporate reorganization carried out solely
to gain a tax benefit. The taxpayer attempted to achieve a lower tax liability
by transferring shares of stock through a corporate reorganization rather than
by transferring the shares by dividend. Although the reorganization plan con-
formed literally to the Code section governing corporate reorganizations, the
Supreme Court denied effect to the transaction. The Court reasoned that
when the Code "speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation to an-
other, it means a transfer made 'in pursuance of a plan of reorganization' ...
of corporate business; and not a transfer of assets by one corporation to
another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of either
. . . ." 12 Thus, the Court held that the existence of a corporation whose sole
purpose was tax avoidance would be denied validity for tax purposes."
Over the years, the Gregory "business purpose" test was extended, by
implication, beyond the field of corporate reorganization to all tax statutes
dealing with commercial or industrial transactions." The test was limited to
denying validity to transactions whose sole purpose was to avoid taxes.' 5 A
transaction was recognized if it had a legitimate nontax purpose even though
the taxpayer's primary motive was to avoid taxes. The Gregory "business
purpose" rule became, in the words of Learned Hand, a general test to deny
recognition to a transaction for tax purposes "that does not appreciably
affect [the taxpayer's] . . . beneficial interest except to reduce his tax
...."" It appears, and for the purpose of this note it will be assumed, that
in the area of taxation, "business purpose" has come to mean any legitimate
nontax purpose.
In the interest deduction area, the courts had difficulty in deciding cases
involving real indebtedness where the sole or controlling motive behind the
transaction in question was tax avoidance.' 7 The three basic post-Gregory
9 See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v, Commis-
sioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.
1968); L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1 (1960).
10 See generally Summers, A Critique of the Business-Purpose Doctrine, 41 Ore. L.
Rev. 38 (1961).
11 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
12 Id. at 469-70.
13 Id .
14 See Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d
Cir. 1949).
15 See Maysteel Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1961). See
also Herzfeld, Is Interest Deductible When Tax-Saving Is Sole Motive? 12 J. Tax. 336
(1960).
16 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
17 See Note, 39 St. John's L. Rev. 77 (1964).
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approaches to this problem are well illustrated by three recent and factually
similar cases, all involving real indebtedness. Bridges v. Commissioner, dis-
regarding the existence of real indebtedness, held that as the taxpayer's
transaction on its face could not make a profit except through a tax deduc-
tion, it was a "sham." 18
 Goldstein v. Commissioner held that even though
the transaction was not a "sham," interest could not be deducted when the
transaction had no purpose apart from its anticipated tax consequences."
Rothschild, of course, allowed interest to be deducted whenever a genuine
indebtedness was found, the motives of the taxpayer being considered
irrelevant 2 0
The Bridges finding that a transaction is a "sham" when it lacks a
"business purpose"21
 is a product of test mixing which has been strongly
criticized. 22 The Goldstein court felt, correctly it seems, that the interest of
candor was better served if the "sham" rationale was reserved for cases
involving merely "hocus-pocus" paper transactions; where the taxpayer never
obligated himself to make interest payments because he never subjected him-
self to an enforcible obligation of indebtedness. 23 As was pointed out in
Fabreeka Prod. Co. v. Commissioner: 24 "The brightness of the motive can-
not be permitted to blind our eyes to the existence of substantive events....
The government's charge that there was no reality to the transaction as an
investment amounts only to saying that it was not entered into for what it
describes as 'investment motives.' "25
18 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963).
15 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966). See L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1, 14 (1960) (dissenting
opinion), and Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). The latter case involved the
borrowing of money from an insurance company to buy annuity bonds and the deducting
of interest paid on the loans. The bonds only returned VA% income while the loans called
for payment of 31/470 interest. The Supreme Court denied the deduction both on the
ground that the transaction did not affect the taxpayer's beneficial interest except to
reduce his tax, id. at 365-66, and on the ground that the transaction was a sham, id. at
366-67. The three dissenters disagreed with the finding of a "sham" transaction and took
the position that as long as the transaction was not "hocus-pocus," the interest deduction
should be allowed. Id. at 370-71. The dual standard announced by the majority left
future courts unsure as to whether Knetsch stood for the requirement of a business pur-
pose when real indebtedness was present or whether, feeling there was no real indebted-
ness, the Court had simply defined "sham" in terms of lack of business purpose. See
generally Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 40 Taxes
296 (1962).
20 7 CCH 1968 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 11 7910. See L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1 (1960).
This case involved a transaction similar to the one in Rothschild. The majority dis-
regarded the tax-savings motive and allowed the deduction because there was a real in-
debtedness. See Doukas, Though Tax-Saving Is Only Motive, Interest Is Deductible, IRS
Concedes, 14 J. Tax. 292 (1961).
21 325 F.2d at 184-85.
22 See Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private
Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 Tul. L. Rev. 355 (1963) ; Note, 46 Cornell L.Q. 649
(1961); Note, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 792 (1967).
23 364 F.2d at 738. The court stated: "Different considerations govern decision as to
whether interest payments are deductible by a taxpayer who borrows money from an
independent lending institution, executes a promissory note with recourse and purchases
Treasury obligations that are then in fact pledged with the lender as security for the
loan for a significant period of time ...." Id.
24 294 F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1961).
25 Id. at 878.
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Goldstein, despite its observation that the "sham" test should not be
used in cases of real indebtedness, held that no deductible interest resulted
from a transaction which had no purpose apart from its tax consequences."
While the court did not refer to this nontax purpose as a "business purpose,"
and, in fact, rejected the application of that test, the requirement it did
impose appears to be no more than the "business purpose" test as it has
come to be interpreted, with a new name.
In Goldstein, the taxpayer, without any real expectation of profit,
bought U.S. Treasury 1% percent notes to secure a loan payable at 4 per-
cent per annum. There was no question as to the reality of the indebtedness,
as the loans were obtained from independent banks which could request addi-
tional collateral. The court denied the deduction, however, after divining the
congressional purpose underlying the interest deduction provision. The court
first determined that Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, in per-
mitting the deduction of "all interest paid or accrued within the taxable
year on indebtedness," precluded any requirement that deductible interest
serve a business purpose, that it be ordinary or necessary, or even that it
be reasonable. 27 But then the court found, underlying this section, a con-
gressional policy to encourage what the court referred to as a "purposive
activity" to be financed through borrowing. In light of this, the court con-
cluded that interest was deductible
when a taxpayer has borrowed funds and incurred an obligation to
pay interest in order to engage in what with reason can be termed
purposive activity, even though he borrowed to gain an interest
deduction rather than to finance the activity in some other way. In
other words, the interest deduction should be permitted whenever
it can be said that the taxpayer's desire to secure an interest deduc-
tion is only one of mixed motives that prompts the taxpayer to bor-
row funds; or put a third way, the deduction is proper if there is
some substance to the loan arrangement beyond the taxpayer's
desire to secure the deduction.28
It is submitted that there is no valid distinction between the "busi-
ness purpose" test and Goldstein's "purposive activity" test." The Goldstein
court defines "purposive activity" in the same terms Judge Hand used to
describe "business purpose", i.e., in terms of the legitimate nontax substance
of the transaction. Furthermore, the court quoted the often repeated state-
ment in Gregory that "the question for determination is whether what was
done apart from tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended.""
It appears to have fallen back on the view expressed in Gregory, that Con-
26 364 F.2d at 741-42.
27 Id. at 741.
28 Id.
29 It must be remembered that the "business purpose" test has been expanded to
deny deductions to a taxpayer in any transaction "that does not appreciably affect his
beneficial interests except to reduce his tax." Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411
(2d Cir. 1957) (dig  nting opinion by L. Hand, J.) ; Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S.
at 361-66; Blum, supra note 19, at 303-05.
30 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1934).
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gress did not intend a purely formal compliance with the language in avoid-
ing a tax.3 ' The court, however, has offered no explanation as to how it con-
cluded that Congress intended the statute to he read in a manner other than
it was written.
The trial commissioner in Rothschild determined that the congressional
intent in section 163(a) was to allow deductions on all real indebtedness
regardless of the purpose or motive behind the transaction. 32 He found that
this congressional intent, in combination with the fact that tax considera-
tions are an essential element in almost every financial transaction, led to the
inescapable conclusion that the motives of the taxpayer should not be con-
trolling as to the deductibility of his interest payments.33
The history of section 163(a) certainly supports the conclusion in
Rothschi/d.34 Section 163 (a) places no express limitation on the deduction of
interest while other sections of the Code expressly require a business purpose
before a transaction will be recognized for tax purposes. 35 For example, sec-
tion 269(a) denies recognition, for tax purposes, to corporate acquisitions
whose "principal purpose . . . is evasion or avoidance of Federal income
tax . . . ." Also, the provisions of section 341 dealing with "collapsible cor-
porations" are aimed directly at the use of a business-in-appearance-but-
not-in-purpose device for avoiding taxes." The specific inclusion of versions
of the business purpose doctrine in other sections of the Code is evidence
in support of the conclusion that had Congress wished interest deductions
to be allowed only if a debt were incurred to promote a business purpose, it
would have clearly expressed such a desire.
The legislative history of Section 163(a) of the 1954 Code and its pre-
decessor, Section 23(b) of the 1939 Code, show that Congress repeatedly
considered and ultimately rejected limitations on the interest deduction. 37
In 1924, Congress rejected an amendment which would have prohibited
deductions for interest paid ". . . on indebtedness incurred or continued
for the purpose of evading the payment of taxes. . . . "35 Restrictions of the
same type were again rejected in 1926." Thus, it seems clear that Congress
intended section 163(a) to allow deductions of interest paid on real indebted-
ness regardless of the taxpayer's motive or purpose. The trial commissioner
in Rothschild relied on this clear congressional intent to allow the deductions
to Rothschild.
This congressional policy toward interest deductions seems so clear that
courts should have had no trouble in applying section 163(a). The problems
arose, however, from an underlying judicial displeasure with the fact that
high income taxpayers were able to get a tax break only because they were in
a high tax bracket. This result seemed to offend the traditional notions of
:31 Id.
32 1968 Stand. Fed. Tai Rep. at 72,523-24.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 72,523-25.
35 § 163(a).
343 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(a) & (b).
37 Infra notes 38-39. See also L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1, 7-8 (1960).
38 See H. Conference Rep. No. 844, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1924).
33 See H. Conference Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 34 (1926).
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fairness under the tax law. Since the terms of section 163 (a) offered no
assistance, many courts tried to rationalize a decision based on their con-
cept of the public policy involved. Therefore, the confusion is caused by
courts that equate their concept of public policy with congressional intent.
A few commentators have suggested that the vagueness of the courts in
the interest area may have its purpose." As one commentator stated: "The
major premises under which tax avoidance is frustrated in some cases and
allowed in others are simply too ephemeral to be articulated. And if such
articulation were possible, it would only serve to challenge further the in-
genuity of the taxpayer." 4 ' In other words, vagueness may make tax manip-
ulators wary and less likely to take a chance.
As has been stated, there appears no reason for disallowance of an inter-
est deduction except the absence of genuine indebtedness. Such doctrines as
the "business purpose" test or the "beneficial interest" test are mere judicial
contrivances to allow courts to reach a finding which they feel to be justified,
not a finding compelled by the statute. Such doctrines hamper the growth of
a consistent and useful body of case law in the interest deduction area. As one
court held:
[U]nless Congress makes it abundantly clear, we do not think tax
consequences should be dependent upon the discovery of a purpose,
or a state of mind, whether it be elaborate or simple. The limitation
which the government asks us to read into the statute, even if appeal-
ing in the particular instance, might readily .....create difficulties
and uncertainties more objectionable in their results than any seem-
ing inequities which would be eliminated or prevented." Granting
the government's proposition that these taxpayers have found a hole
in the dike, we believe it calls for the application of the Congres-
sional thumb, not the court's. 42
The application of the "business purpose" doctrine has been remark-
ably inconsistent. Only by analysis of the transaction and by determination
of the genuineness of the indebtedness can the courts build a consistent
body of law in the interest deduction area. They do not serve this purpose by
reading into the statute a vague policy which only obscures the issue of the
reality of the debt.
DOUGLAS K. MAGARY
40 Blum, supra note 19, at 312.
41 Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1021,
1051 (1953).
42 Fabreeka Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876, 878 (1st Cir. 1961).
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